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RESPONSE: PUBLIC LITIGATION, PRIVATE 
ARBITRATION? 
David L. Noll* 
How should disputes be allocated between litigation and arbitration? Given 
strong incentives for many actors to arbitrate everything, the question turns fun-
damentally on the scope of arbitration under the applicable law. In Re-Inventing 
Arbitration: How Expanding the Scope of Arbitration Is Re-Shaping Its Form and 
Blurring the Line Between Private and Public Adjudication, Professor Deborah 
Hensler and Damira Khatam posit that the “public” or “private” nature of a 
dispute provides the key to whether it belongs in arbitration. While arbitration of 
private disputes is ok, disputes with “public policy dimensions” belong in the 
courts. Hensler and Khatam therefore suggest that Congress override Supreme 
Court decisions mandating arbitration of employment and consumer disputes, 
which, they contend, would restore domestic arbitration to its proper sphere. 
 But can disputes really be divided into public and private categories that 
provide the key to whether they belong in arbitration? This Response suggests 
that on close examination it is exceedingly difficult to identify a reliable proxy for 
the public or private nature of a dispute. The absence of such a proxy suggests 
there is an inescapably political dimension to how disputes are allocated between 
litigation and arbitration. Whether a category of disputes should be heard in a 
public court because the disputes impact the public interest turns out to depend 
on contested judgments about where the public interest lies. This, in turn, sug-
gests a more fundamental reason for Congress to revisit the scope of arbitration 
under the FAA. If the allocation of disputes between litigation and arbitration is 
an inescapably political question, it should ideally be addressed by an institution 
accountable to democratic politics. 
INTRODUCTION 
 Professor Deborah Hensler and Damira Khatam’s engaging survey of the 
development of domestic, international, and investor-state1 arbitration makes a 
trio of contributions to our understanding of this important form of dispute res-
olution procedure. 
First, their article provides a valuable reminder that, although we use “arbi-
tration” to refer to any dispute resolution system where “private decision-
makers outside a public court system” deliver “a binding adjudication” of the 
                                                        
*  Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School; david.noll@rutgers.edu.  
1  See generally Deborah R. Hensler & Damira Khatam, Re-Inventing Arbitration: How Ex-
panding the Scope of Arbitration Is Re-Shaping Its Form and Blurring the Line Between Pri-
vate and Public Adjudication, 18 NEV. L. J. 381, 381 (2018). 
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parties’ claims,2 the term actually refers to several distinct systems, each with 
its own basis of authority, procedures, and external constraints. And within 
each form of “arbitration,” we find many dispute resolution systems that spread 
like branches on the tree of life once parties’ authority to bind themselves to 
arbitrate is recognized.3 
Second, the article demonstrates that, notwithstanding differences in the 
formal legal authorities that underpin different types of arbitration, domestic, 
international, and investor-state arbitration have developed in a similar way. 
After arbitration initially was used to resolve quintessentially “private” dis-
putes, its scope (in all these areas) expanded to include “disputes with [] public 
policy dimensions.”4 This expansion led parties who were subject to arbitration 
agreements as well as external constituencies to demand that arbitration adopt 
court-like procedures—that is, that arbitration “judicialize.”5 With some nota-
ble exceptions,6 institutions responsible for the design of arbitral procedure as-
sented to demands for judicialization. The result was a transformation in arbi-
tration: a private system that delivered quick judgments with little process 
became a system of private courts that, to varying degrees, followed the proce-
dures of their public counterparts. 
Third, drawing on the observation that arbitration’s changing scope has 
“blurr[ed] the line between private and public [adjudication],” the article asks 
whether something has not been lost on the path of arbitration’s evolution.7 
Where we are dealing with a genuinely private dispute, Hensler and Khatam 
ask, shouldn’t the parties be allowed to trade accuracy, fairness, and transpar-
ency for speed, finality, and the benefit of having disputes resolved by a sub-
ject-matter expert? On the other hand, Hensler and Khatam argue that where a 
dispute has “public policy dimensions,” it should be resolved in court, where it 
will be decided by a public official whose decision sets a precedent for future 
cases. Focusing on domestic arbitration, they propose that Congress “reverse 
the [Supreme] Court’s policies with regard to employment and consumer arbi-
                                                        
2  Id. at 387. 
3  In the United States, major forms of arbitration include traditional business-to-business 
arbitration, securities arbitration, franchise arbitration, employment arbitration, and commer-
cial arbitration. Each is the subject of its own body of jurisprudence and case law. It should 
be noted, however, that evolutionary procedural development is not unique to arbitration. Cf. 
Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 767, 784-88 
(2017) (describing scenarios where actors devised “ad hoc” dispute resolution procedures to 
address procedural problems that arose in particular cases). 
4  Hensler & Khatam, supra note 1, at 386–87. 
5  Id. at 394-96, 406-07, 411–16. 
6  See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310–11 (2013) (hold-
ing that an agreement to arbitrate need not preserve incentives for private civil litigation that 
are available in public court, provided the agreement does not violate the express terms of a 
federal law); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336 (2011) (concluding 
that the Federal Arbitration Act “prohibits States from conditioning the enforceability of cer-
tain arbitration agreements on the availability of classwide arbitration procedures.”). 
7  Hensler & Khatam, supra note 1, at 381, 386. 
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tration.”8 By restricting arbitration to “the purely commercial sphere,” Congress 
“could re-define the boundary between private arbitration and public adjudica-
tion and preserve each for its most appropriate uses.”9 
But can disputes really be divided into “public” and “private” categories? 
Is it true that, in the domestic context, the public or private nature of a dispute 
supplies the key to determining whether it is appropriate for arbitration? In this 
response, I suggest that on close examination it is exceedingly difficult to iden-
tify a reliable proxy for the public or private nature of a dispute—and with it, 
the propriety of arbitration on Hensler and Khatam’s view. The absence of a 
reliable proxy for the public or private nature of a dispute suggests a deeper 
reason for Congress to revisit the scope of arbitration under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA) than the reasons Hensler and Khatam consider. The allocation 
of disputes between litigation and arbitration depends on contested judgments 
about the public interest in judicial resolution of particular claims. Ideally, 
those judgments would be made by a branch of government that is responsive 
to democratic politics rather than through judicial exegesis of the FAA. 
I begin a step removed from Hensler and Khatam’s proposal that Congress 
reverse the Supreme Court’s cases expanding consumer and employment arbi-
tration and describe the difficulties with the proxy U.S. law historically used to 
identify the public or private nature of a dispute—the presence of statutory 
claims. I then consider other possible proxies for the public or private nature of 
a dispute, including Hensler and Khatam’s distinction between commercial and 
non-commercial disputes, and find them equally lacking. The lack of good 
proxies for the public or private nature of a dispute suggests there is an ines-
capably political dimension to how disputes are allocated between litigation 
and arbitration. That, in turn, suggests a need for greater congressional in-
volvement in choices about the scope of the arbitration under the FAA. Be-
cause the allocation of disputes between arbitration and litigation turns on ines-
capably political judgments about the institutions and procedures used to 
enforce the law, it is difficult to see why those choices should be made by the 
Supreme Court alone.  
I. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN JUDICIAL RESOLUTION OF STATUTORY CLAIMS  
For most of the twentieth century, U.S. law allocated disputes between liti-
gation and arbitration based on the presence of absence or statutory claims.10 It 
appears that until the 1950s no party thought to argue that federal statutory 
claims were subject to arbitration under the FAA.11 When a brokerage argued 
                                                        
8  Id. at 423. 
9  Id. 
10  For purposes of this discussion, I assume that a dispute is covered by an agreement to ar-
bitrate that is valid as a matter of contract law. 
11  See Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 441 (2d Cir. 1953) (describing the arbitrability of 
claims under section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 as “an interesting question of statutory 
construction said to be of first impression”); see also Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Micon-
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in Wilko v. Swan that claims under section twelve of the Securities Act of 1933 
were arbitrable, the Supreme Court rejected the argument in terms which sug-
gested that federal statutory claims could never be arbitrated.12  
Wilko’s exclusion of statutory claims from arbitration was based on the 
idea that claims to enforce regulatory statutes are qualitatively different from 
the type of commercial disputes merchants had long arbitrated. The prototypi-
cal dispute in arbitration was a claim for breach of contract, which requires the 
arbitrator to apply the common law of contracts in light of trade practice and 
the arbitrator’s business experience.13 In contrast, Congress creates private 
rights of action to accomplish public regulatory goals through private civil liti-
gation.14 The public interest in statutory claims, Wilko reasoned, requires that 
they be resolved in court.15 
The difficulties with using the presence of statutory claims to identify the 
public interest in a dispute are illustrated by Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the landmark 1985 case that abandoned Wilko’s view 
that statutory claims are categorically ineligible for arbitration.16 The case arose 
out of the breakdown in the business relationship between Mitsubishi, the Japa-
nese car manufacturer, and Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, a Puerto Rican dealer-
ship.17 In the years before the dispute, Soler conducted a brisk business selling 
Mitsubishi vehicles to the famously car-loving people of Puerto Rico.18 Expect-
ing that the good times would continue to roll, Mitsubishi and Soler entered in-
to an agreement that obligated Soler to buy and re-sell even more vehicles than 
it had sold in the coming years. But the market slowed, and Soler found itself 
unable to sell all of the cars that it had committed to buy.19 
                                                                                                                                 
struction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by 
Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 139 (2006) (noting that no witnesses during congres-
sional hearings on the FAA discussed arbitration of statutory claims). 
12  See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435–37 (1953) (reasoning that the effectiveness of the 
Securities Act depended on the Act being enforced via “judicial proceedings,” and that al-
lowing claims to be arbitrated was inconsistent with the Securities Act because the move 
from litigation to arbitration would weaken the Act’s “protective provisions”). 
13  See Daniel Markovits, Arbitration’s Arbitrage: Social Solidarity at the Nexus of Adjudica-
tion and Contract, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 431, 431–32 (2010). 
14  See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS 
IN THE U.S. 3–4 (2010); see also Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: 
Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 33 (1982); David L. Noll, 
Regulating Arbitration, 105 CAL. L. REV. 985, 1010–12 (2017). 
15  See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438. 
16  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631, 665 (1985). 
Prior to Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court had ordered arbitration of a federal statutory claim in 
a single case, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., which the Court described as arising out of a 
“truly international” merger agreement. 417 U.S. 506, 515 (1974). 
17  Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 616–17. 
18  Id. at 617. On Puerto Rico’s car culture, see GUILLERMO GIUCCI, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF 
THE AUTOMOBILE: ROADS TO MODERNITY 103 (Anne Mayagoitia & Debra Nagao trans. 
2012). 
19  Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 617. 
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The dealership attempted to renegotiate its purchase agreement, but 
Mitsubishi refused, presumably because it relies on dealers’ orders to plan pro-
duction.20 Soler then proposed to “transship” the cars it could not sell to the 
continental United States, which has a larger new car market than Puerto Ri-
co.21 Mitsubishi again refused the request—this time because cars produced for 
the Puerto Rican market do not have heaters and defoggers needed to operate in 
cold weather.22 Invoking an arbitration clause in Soler’s dealer agreement, 
Mitsubishi began an arbitration against Soler before the Japan Commercial Ar-
bitration Association, and filed an action to compel Soler to arbitrate in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Puerto Rico.23 
It is here that a statutory claim entered the case. At the time, First Circuit 
precedent did not allow arbitration of Sherman Act claims on the theory that, 
just as “issues of war and peace are too important to be vested in the generals[’] 
decisions as to antitrust regulation of business are too important to be lodged in 
arbitrators chosen from the business community.”24 In response to Mitsubishi’s 
motion to compel arbitration under the FAA, Soler asserted a Sherman Act 
counter-claim, arguing that Mitsubishi’s refusal to allow it to transship the ex-
cess cars to the continental United States was an unlawful restraint on trade.25 
The public interest in Mitsubishi’s dispute with Soler was vanishingly 
small. At bottom, the dispute went to which party, Mitsubishi or Soler, bore the 
cost of Soler’s ill-advised bet that there would continue to be high demand for 
Mitsubishi vehicles in Puerto Rico. Soler’s Sherman Act counter-claim bor-
dered on the frivolous, and appears to have been asserted in an effort to ensure 
that the Puerto Rico district court rather than the Japanese arbitral panel would 
hear the merits of the dispute. Notwithstanding the Sherman Act claim, this was 
not a dispute that many people besides Mitsubishi or Soler would have cared 
about. Seen from this perspective, one can understand the Supreme Court’s 
conclusion in Mitsubishi that statutory claims are not inherently unsuitable for 
arbitration.26 
At the same time, cases that do not involve claims under a federal regulato-
ry statute may implicate the public interest. For example, In re Checking Ac-
                                                        
20  Id. 
21  Id. at 617–18. 
22  Id. at 618, n.1. 
23  The clause provided: “All disputes, controversies or differences which may arise between 
[Mitsubishi] and [Soler] out of or in relation to Articles I-B through V of this Agreement or 
for the breach thereof, shall be finally settled by arbitration in Japan in accordance with the 
rules and regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association.” Id. at 617–19. 
24  See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155, 162 (1st Cir. 
1983), rev’d, 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
25  Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 618–20. 
26  See id. at 639–40 (“[W]e require this representative of the American business community 
to honor its bargain by holding this agreement to arbitrate enforceable in accord with the ex-
plicit provisions of the Arbitration Act” (citations and alterations in original omitted)). 
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count Overdraft Litigation27 involved banks’ practice of reordering checking-
account transactions before they were posted to customers’ accounts. Virtually 
all banks charge a fee when a customer attempts a transaction that she lacks ad-
equate funds to complete.28 By reordering the transactions customers performed 
on a given day from largest to smallest before they were posted to customers’ 
accounts, banks were able to charge many times more overdraft fees than if 
transactions were posted in chronological order.29 Plaintiffs in the Overdraft lit-
igation alleged that this practice breached the duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing in banks’ customer agreements.30 They sought damages for banks’ violation 
of this duty and state unfair competition laws.31 
Even though the Overdraft litigation did not involve claims under federal 
regulatory statutes, the case involved matters of obvious public concern. After 
Congress enacted the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, overdraft fees reportedly became a 
major source of revenue to retail banks, creating an incentive for banks to max-
imize those fees in any way possible.32 The practice at issue in the litigation af-
fected every checking account customer in the United States who has ever 
overdrawn her account. The forward-looking relief that plaintiffs sought—an 
injunction directing banks to stop reordering transactions or provide better dis-
closures—potentially affected bank customers who had never overdrawn their 
account. Yet, because the plaintiffs chose not to assert federal statutory claims, 
the case would have been arbitrable under pre-Mitsubishi law if the require-
ments for arbitration were otherwise met. 
As Mitsubishi and the Overdraft litigation illustrate, the presence or ab-
sence of statutory claims is not a reliable signal of whether a dispute affects the 
public interest. On one hand, statutory claims may be insubstantial, asserted for 
strategic reasons, or peripheral to the central dispute in a case. On the other 
hand, a pure “private law” dispute can affect a large segment of the public and 
raise important questions about the regulation of business and the rights of 
firms, consumers, and employees. Moreover, parties may choose not to assert 
statutory claims for idiosyncratic reasons (avoiding removal to federal court, 
limiting the scope of discovery, etc.), even though statutory claims could be as-
serted without violating the applicable rules of procedure and canons of profes-
sional responsibility.  
 
                                                        
27  See Johnson v. Keybank Nat’l Ass’n, 754 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2014). 
28  See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, Overdrawn: Persistent Confusion and Concern About 
Bank Overdraft Practices 8 (June, 2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/Assets/2014/06/ 
26/Safe_Checking_Overdraft_Survey_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ECL-R9WG]. 
29  See Johnson, 754 F.3d at 1293. 
30  See, e.g., Class Action Complaint at 16, Kennedy v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., No. 1:11-
CV-21313 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011). 
31  Id. at 20–21. 
32  See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, Rule Could Let Consumers Sue Finan-
cial Firms, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2017, at A1. 
18 NEV. L.J. 477, NOLL - FINAL 3/27/18  3:23 PM 
Winter 2018] PUBLIC LITIGATION, PRIVATE ARBITRATION? 483 
II. OTHER POTENTIAL CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING  
THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN DISPUTES 
Difficulties with using the presence or absence of statutory claims to iden-
tify the public interest in a dispute raise the question of whether an alternative 
proxy exists that can identify disputes that are inappropriate for arbitration be-
cause they implicate the public interest. The obvious alternatives, however, fare 
no better than the presence or absence of statutory claims in separating “public” 
disputes from “private” ones. 
A. Quality of Contractual Assent 
One alternative suggested by Hensler and Khatam is to look at the quality 
of parties’ agreement to arbitrate. Hensler and Khatam contend that, if Con-
gress overrode Supreme Court decisions allowing arbitration of consumer and 
employment disputes, it would limit arbitration to “purely commercial” dis-
putes that do not affect the public interest.33 This proposal rests on two assump-
tions: first, that parties genuinely agree to arbitrate commercial disputes, and 
second, that disputes where the parties have genuinely agreed to arbitrate are 
unlikely to affect the public interest. Agreements to arbitrate non-commercial 
disputes, by contrast, are less likely to be supported by genuine contractual dis-
putes.34 And because those disputes involve parties with unequal bargaining 
power, they are comparatively more likely to raise issues that affect the public 
interest than commercial disputes.35 
The first assumption—that agreements to arbitrate commercial disputes are 
based on stronger contractual assent than “agreements” to arbitrate consumer 
and employment disputes—is undoubtedly correct. When consumers and em-
ployees agree to arbitrate legal disputes, they do so via boilerplate clauses in 
standard-form contracts of adhesion that few consumers notice or understand.36 
Even apologists for consumer arbitration concede that the “assent” to arbitrate 
                                                        
33  See Hensler & Khatam, supra note 1, at 423. 
34  See id. at 422 (“[I]n extending enforcement of arbitration agreements to employment and 
consumer contracts of adhesion that require arbitration, the U.S. Supreme Court has honored 
the principle [that parties should be permitted to agree to arbitrate] in word only.”). 
35  See id. at 393 (“[A]rbitration was no longer applied solely to relatively evenly-matched 
commercial partners, but also to wildly unequal employees and employers, consumers and 
corporations, and patients and health care providers.”). 
36  A seminal early study is Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Ar-
bitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (2004). For later studies, see, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, 
ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET 
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a) (2015); Yannis Bakos, et al., Does An-
yone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (2014). 
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reflected in such contracts is weaker than the assent to arbitrate in a commercial 
contract, which will generally be negotiated by counsel.37 
But the second assumption—that strong contractual assent to arbitrate indi-
cates the public interest in a dispute is weak—is shakier. On one hand, cases in 
which sophisticated parties genuinely agree to arbitrate can raise issues of in-
tense public concern. If Apple, Google, and Microsoft agreed to arbitrate all 
claims against one another for patent infringement, their agreement could not 
be attacked on the ground that the parties did not genuinely agree to arbitrate. 
Still, the public would justifiably be interested in the companies’ disputes, inso-
far as those revealed information about the validity and scope of patents that 
the companies held.38 On the other hand, one can imagine situations in which 
the public interest supports arbitration even if one side’s assent to arbitration is 
weak. In a fascinating article, Professor Jill Gross documents the origins of 
domestic securities arbitration in the New York Stock Exchange’s requirement 
that brokers agree to arbitrate customers’ claims.39 Based in part on fears that 
nineteenth-century courts were too slow to provide effective relief to defrauded 
consumers, the NYSE required brokers to arbitrate customers’ claims before an 
“arbitration committee” of its own members.40 This alternative forum, the ex-
change reasoned, would increase investors’ confidence in exchange-traded se-
curities, even if it meant that individual brokers would be worse off than they 
would be if customers were forced to litigate in court.41 
Brokers’ “assent” to arbitrate customers’ claims before the NYSE’s arbitra-
tion committee was as weak as customers’ “assent” to arbitrate claims in mod-
ern consumer contracts. A broker who wanted to trade securities via the ex-
change was presented with a take-it-or-leave-it-offer: agree to arbitration, or 
take your business elsewhere. But requiring arbitration ensured that customers’ 
claims would be adjudicated in a timely manner. In doing so, the exchange’s 
system of “forced” arbitration advanced the public interest by increasing inves-
tor confidence in the stock market. Similar considerations underpin an array of 
federal statutes that encourage arbitration of claims related to public programs 
                                                        
37  See Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia, 112 MICH. L. REV. 
883, 883 (2014) (“[T]he fine print is not a contract. There is no agreement to it, no real con-
sent, not even ‘blanket assent.’ It is nothing but paperwork. . . .”) (reviewing MARGARET 
JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 
(2013)). 
38  Based on similar concerns, the Patent Act provides that an arbitral award resolving a 
claim for patent infringement is not effective until it is delivered to the Director of the Patent 
and Trademark Office, and requires the office to enter the award in the patent’s prosecution 
history. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 294(d)–(e) (2012). 
39  See Jill Gross, The Historical Basis of Securities Arbitration as an Investor Protection 
Mechanism, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 171, 174–75 (2016). 
40  See id. at 176. 
41  See id. (concluding that the exchange mandated arbitration “to ensure that industry norms 
would be enforced, even if those norms were unlawful and not enforceable in court, and sec-
ondarily to provide a rapid resolution of a dispute whose value changed quickly as the stock 
market rose or fell”). 
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and claims against the government.42 The public interest in a dispute, these 
statutes suggest, does not necessarily track the quality of the contracting par-
ties’ assent to arbitrate. 
B. Parties 
Another proxy that might be used to determine whether a dispute affects 
the public interest looks to the presence of public institutions and officials as 
parties.43 If a public agency or officer was a party to a dispute, that fact would 
be taken as conclusive evidence of the dispute’s publicness, thereby excluding 
the dispute from arbitration. The law might even exclude a dispute from arbi-
tration if a government actor participated as an intervener or amicus curiae, al-
lowing the public interest in a dispute to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, 
based on government officials’ assessment of the public interest in particular 
cases.44 
The difficulty with assessing the public interest in a dispute based on the 
presence of government parties is that the approach is wildly under-inclusive. 
No government institution or agency participated in the Overdraft litigation, 
even though the case touched on matters of obvious public concern. The list of 
similar cases is virtually limitless. Every major corporate dispute,45 every case 
alleging that a national employer engaged in a pattern and practice of employ-
ment discrimination,46 and every class action alleging that a corporation de-
frauded a large number of people47 raises issues that are important to the public. 
                                                        
42  See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 572(a) (providing generally that “[a]n agency may use a dispute reso-
lution proceeding for the resolution of an issue in controversy that relates to an administra-
tive program, if the parties agree to such proceeding”); 49 U.S.C. § 11708 (authorizing the 
Surface Transportation Board “to establish a voluntary and binding arbitration process to 
resolve rail rate and practice complaints subject to the jurisdiction of the Board”). See also 
Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1229 (2015) (discussing mandatory 
arbitration of rail service metric disputes under the Passenger Rail Investment and Improve-
ment Act of 2008, 122 Stat. 4907). 
43  U.S. arbitration law currently follows a version of this approach. Under EEOC v. Waffle 
House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295–98 (2002), a federal administrative agency such as the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission may pursue victim-specific relief on behalf of a party 
who is bound to arbitrate disputes, even if the agency pursues the exact same relief (rein-
statement, backpay, etc.) that a plaintiff would pursue in arbitration. The formal justification 
for this rule is that the agency is asserting a cause of action that belongs to it, and is not 
bound by private parties’ agreement to arbitrate. 
44  See EEOC v. Doherty Enter., Inc., 126 F. Supp. 3d 1305, 1306 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (discuss-
ing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s efforts to invalidate arbitration 
agreements used as part of a pattern and practice of employment discrimination). See also 
Zachary D. Clopton, Class Actions and Executive Power, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 886–87 
(2017); David L. Noll, Deregulating Arbitration, 30 LOY. CONS. L. REV. 51, 69 n.66 (2017). 
On the design of agency pre-screening mechanisms, see generally David Freeman Engstrom, 
Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616, 644 (2013). 
45  See, e.g., Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323, 327 (3d Cir. 2015). 
46  See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
47  See, e.g., Low v. Trump U., LLC, 246 F. Supp. 3d 1295 (S.D. Cal. 2017). 
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But such cases are regularly litigated without the involvement, as party, inter-
vener, or amicus curiae, of any governmental actor.  
C. Third-Party Effects  
Still another alternative would be to allocate disputes between litigation 
and arbitration based on a dispute’s likely effects on third parties—that is, to 
ask whether a dispute is likely to produce externalities.48 Following this ap-
proach, a dispute with effects that were limited to the named parties would be 
considered “private” and eligible for arbitration. Disputes that predictably af-
fected third parties would not. To calibrate the allocation of business between 
litigation and arbitration, the law might insist that third-party effects be non-
trivial, substantial, serious, or attain some other threshold. 
In a legal system that follows the rule of stare decisis, however, every case 
is pregnant with the potential to set a precedent that affects the rights of the 
public at large. Consider Mitsubishi. What began as an insignificant dispute 
about a car dealer’s excess inventory became a vehicle for the Supreme Court 
to reverse the long-standing view that the FAA did not contemplate arbitration 
of statutory claims.49 It strains belief to think that, when Mitsubishi filed its suit 
seeking to compel Soler to arbitrate, it could anticipate the effects of its lawsuit. 
A defender of the externalities approach might object that arbitral awards can 
never affect third parties, because they are not entitled to precedential effect.50 
But courts and arbitrators increasingly reject this view.51 As Hensler and Kha-
tam observe, “the publication of awards facilitates the development of a com-
mercial arbitration jurisprudence, wherein arbitrators can look to awards in 
previously decided similar cases as precedents.”52 
CONCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF FORUM CHOICE 
The “public” or “private” nature of a dispute provides an intuitively ap-
pealing way of sorting cases between litigation and arbitration. But on close 
examination, it is difficult to identify a proxy that reliably captures a dispute’s 
public or private character. Neither the presence of statutory claims, the quality 
                                                        
48  For a doctrinal antecedent to this approach, see Nw. Nat. Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 
372, 376 (7th Cir. 1990) (“We are persuaded that the only good reason for treating a forum 
selection clause differently from any other contract (specifically, from the contract in which 
the clause appears) is the possibility of adverse effects on third parties.”). See also David L. 
Noll, Rethinking Anti-Aggregation Doctrine, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649 (2012) (proposing 
that the enforceability of arbitral class-action waivers turn on whether they permit substantial 
unremedied wrongdoing). 
49  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
50  See W. Mark C. Weidenmaier, Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create Precedent, 
90 N.C. L. REV. 1091–92 (2012) (describing the traditional view that arbitral awards are not 
entitled to precedential effect). 
51  See id. at 1116. 
52  See Hensler & Khatam, supra note 1, at 408. 
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of the parties’ assent to arbitrate, the presence of public actors as parties, or the 
likelihood that a dispute will affect third parties reliably signals the public in-
terest in a dispute—and thus, its suitability for arbitration on Hensler and Kha-
tam’s view. 
The lack of good proxies for the public or private character of a dispute 
suggests a more basic reason for Congress to engage questions about the scope 
of arbitration under the FAA than the ones Hensler and Khatam consider. The 
problem is not that consumer and employment disputes necessarily affect the 
public interest, or that the FAA’s legislative history shows unequivocally that 
Congress intended those disputes to be resolved in court.53 Rather, the alloca-
tion of disputes between litigation and arbitration depends on contested—and 
inescapably political—judgments about the public interest in judicial resolution 
of particular disputes. Because of their accountability to democratic politics, 
those matters are appropriately resolved in the political branches.  
Intriguingly, Congress has begun to re-engage the scope of arbitration un-
der the FAA after a long period in which it largely ceded control of the issue to 
the Supreme Court.54 This development is most visible in the area of financial 
regulation. In the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act Congress prohibited the use of arbitra-
tion in domains where it was thought to raise risks of abuse, and authorized the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau to regulate the use of arbitration in broker-dealer and consumer financial 
contracts.55 More recently, the 115th Congress repealed the Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau’s arbitration rule, which would have prohibited the use 
of arbitral class action waivers in consumer financial contracts, via the Con-
gressional Review Act.56 
The merits of this legislation regulating and then de-regulating the use of 
arbitration can certainly be debated.57 But from the perspective of democratic 
politics, Congress’s engagement with the scope of arbitration under the FAA is 
an improvement over the court-dominated status quo ante. Political actors have 
long recognized that the institutions and procedures through which the law is 
enforced are central to its meaning. In addressing the arbitrability of its laws, 
                                                        
53  See Hensler & Khatam, supra note 1, at 423 & n.73. 
54  See generally Noll, supra note 44. 
55  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 921, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (authorizing Securities Exchange Commission to regulate bro-
ker-dealers’ use of arbitration in customer agreements); id. § 922 (prohibiting arbitration of 
certain whistleblower claims); id. § 1028 (authorizing Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau to regulate consumer financial companies’ use of arbitration); id. § 1057(d) (prohibiting 
arbitration of certain whistleblower claims created by Dodd-Frank); id. § 1414 (prohibiting 
use of arbitration clauses in residential mortgage contracts). 
56  H.R.J. Res. 111, 115th Cong. (2017). 
57  See David L. Noll, The Dangerous Consequences of Repealing the CFPB’s Arbitration 
Rule, REG. REV. (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/11/06/noll-repealing-
arbitration-rule/ [https://perma.cc/HXN7-Y35Z]. 
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Congress makes clear the political dimensions of this choice—and takes own-
ership of it. 
